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Thirty-five years ago, in his landmark Lemon v. Kurtzman opinion, Chief Justice
Warren Burger declared that state actions could "excessive[ly]"-and, therefore, uncon-
stitutionally-"entangle" government and religion,' not only by requiring or allowing
intrusive monitoring by officials of religious institutions and activities, but also through
their "divisive political potential."2 He worried that government actions burdened
with this "potential" pose a "threat to the normal political process ' 3 and "divert atten-
tion from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government."4
And, he insisted that "political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.,5 Accordingly,
he concluded that the parochial-school-funding programs under review in Lemon
were unconstitutional, not only because they "foster[ed] an impermissible degree of
entanglement" between government and religion,6 but also because they were likely
to "intensifly]" "[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines."7
As I have described in detail elsewhere,8 Chief Justice Burger's view that the First
Amendment not only authorizes, but also invites, judges to look to their observa-
tions and predictions of political division along religious lines for the enforceable
* Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The papers
that follow were presented at the January 7, 2006 meeting of the Section on Law and
Religion of the American Association of Law Schools, in Washington, D.C. I served as the
Program Chair for the Section in 2005, and am very grateful to the scholars who accepted
my invitation to participate in the program and also to the many who attended the session and
posed thoughtful, provocative questions.
Portions of this short introduction are adapted or excerpted from two other papers of
mine, in which I explore many of the questions engaged by the participants in this sympo-
sium. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1666 (2006); Richard W. Garnett, Civic Unity and Religious Pluralism, CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming) (reviewing NoAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005) and KEvN SEAMUS HASSON, THE
RIGHT To BE WRONG: ENDING THE CULTURE WAR OvER RELIGION IN AMERICA (2005)).
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
2 Id. at 622.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 623.
5 Id. at 622.
6 Id. at 615.
Id. at 623.
8 See Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, supra note *
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
content of the Establishment Clause has, since Lemon, been endorsed and employed
by many scholars, judges, commentators, and citizens, in many cases and contexts.
More generally, the claims that America is divided and religion is divisive are unavoid-
able in-indeed, they animate and shape-much of what is said and written today
about law, politics, religion, and culture. We have all seen the maps and survey results
that are said to reveal--or, maybe, to construct--our 'Two Americas"9 : Red and Blue,
Metro and Retro, 0 "United States of Canada" and "Jesusland."" And, we have all
heard, time and again, about the "culture wars"' 2 pitting-in the words of one of our
more clear-eyed social observers--"racist fascist knuckle-dragging NASCAR-obsessed
cousin-marrying roadkill-eating tobacco-juice-dribbling gun-fondling religious
fanatic rednecks" against "godless unpatriotic pierced-nose Volvo-driving France-
loving left-wing communist latte-sucking tofu-chomping holistic-wacko neurotic
vegan weenie perverts.' 3 True, many social scientists have questioned the post-Bush
v. Gore "Red v. Blue" thesis, and suggested that, in fact, our country and communi-
ties come in a wide range of purple shades. 4 Still, the "religion is divisive" meme
continues to spread through and to shape both litigation and public conversations.
For example, Justice David Souter observed not long ago that "[w]e are centuries
away from the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre and the treatment of heretics in early
Massachusetts, but the divisiveness of religion in current public life is inescapable."' 5
Indeed, according to a prominent philosopher, Richard Dawkins, "[o]nly the willfully
blind could fail to implicate the divisive force of religion in most, if not all, of the
9 STANLEY B. GREENBERG, THE Two AMERICAS: OUR CURRENT POLIICAL DEADLOCK
AND How To BREAK IT (2004).
10 JOHN SPERLING ET AL., THE GREAT DIVIDE: RETRO VS. METRO AMERICA (2004).
" See One Nation, Divisible, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 100 (describing
"a new map" that "began making its way around the Internet" after the November 2004 elec-
tions, depicting the "United States of Canada" and "Jesusland," and suggesting "a geopo-
litical re-sorting of North America into two more culturally cohesive and geographically
sensible nations").
12 JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
'3 Dave Barry, Can't We All Just Get Along?, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 2004, at IM.
14 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED
AMERICA (2005); David Campbell,A House Divided? What Social Science Has to Say About
the Culture War, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 59, 60 (2006) ("While there is admittedly
some debate over the degree to which Americans are polarized, the fairest reading of the evid-
ence suggests that, across the issue spectrum, Americans are not as far apart as the pundits would
have you believe." (citation omitted)); Jonathan Rauch, Bipolar Disorder, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 102 ("American politics is polarized but the American public is not. In fact,
what may be the most striking feature of the contemporary American landscape... is not the
culture war but the culture peace."). For an interesting online collection of alternative maps
that emphasize the "purple," rather than the "red" and "blue," that the 2004 presidential election
revealed, see Michael Gastner et al., Maps and Cartograms of the 2004 US Presidential Election
Results, http://www-personal.umich.edu/ -mejn/election/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
"s McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005).
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violent enmities in the world today."' 6 Former Senator and Ambassador John Danforth
(who is also an Episcopal priest), is not quite so harsh, but still warns that while, "[a]t
its best, religion can be a uniting influence .... in practice, nothing is more divisive."'17
In addition, prominent jurists and scholars continue to urge that the asserted ten-
dency of a particular policy to cause, or to reflect, religion-related divisiveness may
and should be taken into account by judges asked to evaluate its constitutional validity.
Indeed, the argument that what Chief Justice Burger called "political division along
religious lines"' 8 is constitutionally significant, as well as politically, culturally, or aes-
thetically troubling, appears to be enjoying something of a comeback after a time on the
doctrinal back burner.'9 Justice Breyer, for example, in his crucial concurring opinion
in one of the recent Ten Commandments cases, identified "avoid[ing] that divisive-
ness based upon religion that promotes social conflict" as one of the "basic purposes
of [the Religion] Clauses." 20 He then voted to reject the First Amendment challenge
to the public display at issue in part because, in his view, to sustain it "might well en-
courage disputes" and "thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid."'" Similarly, in his succinct, widely
noted book, Active Liberty, Justice Breyer re-affirmed that "the need to avoid a 'divi-
siveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict"' does and should provide
a "critical value" that ought to direct the exercise of judicial review.22 Professor Noah
Feldman's recent study, Divided By God, sounds a similar note. The political divi-
sions associated with religion and religious activism pose, he warns, "a fundamental
challenge to the project of popular self-government."'2 It is in part because, he thinks,
16 RICHARD DAwKINS, A DEVIL'S CHAPLAIN: REFLECTION ON HOPE, LIES, SCIENCE AND
LOvE 161 (2003).
17 John C. Danforth, Op-Ed, In the Name of Politics, N.Y. TIMEs, March 30,2005, at A 17;
see also JOHN C. DANFORTH, FAITH AND POLITICs: How THE "MORAL VALUES" DEBATE
DIVIDEs AMERICA AND How TO MOVE FORwARD TOGETHER (2006).
18 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
'9 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The dissent
resurrects the concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court but that post-
Aguilar cases have rightly disregarded."). Butsee id. at 872 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The
Court may well have moved away from considering the political divisiveness threatened by
particular instances of aid as a practical criterion for applying the Establishment Clause case
by case, but we have never questioned its importance as a motivating concern behind the Estab-
lishment Clause, nor could we change history to find that sectarian conflict did not influence
the Framers who wrote it.").
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring).
2I Id. at 2871. Justice Stevens went even farther, referring to "Government's obligation to
avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the religious sphere." Id. at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
122, 124 (2005) (quoting Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
23 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 251 (2005).
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school-choice programs "create[] conflict and division" and "generate balkanized
values" that such programs violate the Establishment Clause, properly understood.24
I believe that judicial efforts to impose tranquility and cohesion--or, at least, to
exclude certain forms of dissent-actually exacerbate the conflicts, and sharpen the
cleavages, that a divisiveness-focused inquiry purports to police.25 In any event, it
is not clear that reducing or eliminating "divisiveness" in American public life is
possible or desirable, let alone the First Amendment's judicially enforceable mandate.
Observations and predictions, by judges or anyone else, of "political divisiveness
along religious lines" should play no role in the interpretation and application of the
Religion Clauses. Stated simply, while "political divisiveness along religious lines"
might be undesirable and unattractive, and might signal problems in the political life
of a community, and might attend violations of the Establishment Clause, it none-
theless should play no role in the evaluation by judges of Religion Clauses-based
challenges to state action, because what it signals-i.e., disagreement, pluralism, and
the exercise of religious freedom-is, in the end, constitutionally protected. Madison's
warning remains as powerful as ever:
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which
it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish lib-
erty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction
than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential
to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.26
The distinguished contributors to this symposium examine and unpack the many
empirical, doctrinal, and normative presuppositions and assumptions implied by its
title, "Religion, Division, and the Constitution."'27 For example: what, exactly, is
"divisiveness based upon religion," the avoidance of which is, according to Justice
24 Id. at 244-45. But see, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Regulatory Strings and Religious
Freedom: Requiring Private Schools to Promote Public Values, in EDUCATING CITIZENS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE (Patrick J. Wolf &
Stephen Macedo eds., 2004); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice:
Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281 (2002).
25 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected
Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1248 ("[I]t is not clear that any
particular constitutional provision on this subject is well calculated to eliminate contention:
excluding religion from some area of the public domain can be as controversial as including
it."). See generally Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, supra note .
26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
27 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religions, Fragmentation, and Doctrinal Limits, 15 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 25, 25 (2006) ("The title of this symposium ... suggests certain presup-
positions.... The title also implies some less obvious assumptions.").
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Breyer, a "basic purpose" of the Religion Clauses?' What, exactly, is or should be the
relevance of such conflict to the wisdom, morality, or constitutionality of laws and
state actions? How plausible, and how normatively attractive, is Chief Justice Burger's
political-divisiveness argument, and how well does this argument cohere with the rele-
vant text, history, traditions, and values? What does the resurfacing of this argument
reveal, and what does it portend about the state and direction of First Amendment the-
ory and doctrine?
Professor Gedicks, in his paper, takes a scalpel to the thesis that "Religion Clause
doctrine should mediate the political, social, and cultural divisions caused by reli-
gion,"29 suggesting that this thesis misses key facts about "religion"-in particular,
the "penetrat[ion]" of "even conservative religion" by "postmodern sensibilities"-
in contemporary America.3° Professor Campbell brings a political scientist's tools
and perspective to the claim that America is badly polarized, and explores what he
sees as a shift from denominational divisions to a "devotional divide," i.e., between
religiously-informed moral traditionalists and more secular political progressives.3'
Professor Horwitz studies closely and carefully the debate, which rekindled during
the nomination and confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, about the
constraints, if any, imposed by the Constitution's Religious Test Clause on the con-
sideration by Senators and others of a judicial nominee's religious faith and back-
ground.32 He notes that because "treating religion with genuine respect means sub-
jecting it to criticism as well as praise," we should not expect divisiveness to disappear
as our public conversations become-as he thinks they should-richer and more
honest.33 Professor Feldman's paper looks at judges' decision-making, rather than
their nomination and confirmation, and contends that legal scholars should pay more
attention to the connection between judges' religious affiliations and their rulings.34
In something of a response, though, Professor Solum argues that religious division
is better regarded not as a problem to be cured by willful judging but as a component
of pluralism, which itself "can and should work as a force for constitutional con-
sensus." 35 In his view, judges best contribute to the stability of the constitutional order
28 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
29 Gedicks, supra note 27, at 25.
30 See generally id.
"' Campbell, supra note 14.
32 See generally Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and
Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
75 (2006).
3 See id. at 79-95.
3 Stephen M. Feldman, Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM.
& MARY BiLL RTS. J. 43 (2006).
" Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 7, 7 (2006).
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not by policing the arena of debate and policy for excessive divisiveness, but by
submitting to the discipline of legal formalism.
The American Jesuit, John Courtney Murray, once observed that "pluralism [is]
the native condition of American society" and that the unity toward which Americans
have long aspired is and must be a "unity of a limited order., 36 This observation
strikes me as correct. Those who crafted our Constitution believed that both authentic
freedom and effective government could be secured through checks and balances,
rather than standardization, and by harnessing, rather than homogenizing, the messi-
ness of democracy. It is both misguided and quixotic, then, to employ the First Amend-
ment to smooth out the bumps and divisions-religious and otherwise-that are an
unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse and free people,37 and perhaps also
an indication that society is functioning well.38
36 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 27 (1960).
" See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, TRB From Washington: Federal Express, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 13, 2004, at 6 ("[C]ultural polarization is emphatically not a problem. It's a sign of
political health, a bellwether of a society that has not given up on debating first-principle
issues of human morality.").
38 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 213 (2003) ("Well-
functioning societies [should] take steps to discourage conformity and to promote dissent.").
[Vol. 15:1
